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BEYOND MANICHEANISM: ASSESSING
THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM
LISA HILBINK*
Over the past twenty-five years, the 'judicial turn" that began in
Europe in the wake of World War II has spread to almost all corners
of the globe.' In established and emerging democracies alike, parlia-
mentary sovereignty is in decline and constitutional courts with broad
powers have become commonplace.2 Although the formal introduc-
tion of judicial review mechanisms does not necessarily translate to an
energetic assertion ofjudicial authority in all places, ' it is true that in
many polities, courts now play an unprecedented role in the poli-
cymaking process.4
Perhaps not surprisingly, normative responses to the rise of the
new constitutionalism among Anglo/American-trained scholars of law
and courts have followed the contours of the debate over judicial re-
view in the United States, splitting generally between liberal enthusi-
asm and democratic dismay. Enthusiasts view courts as an important
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. B.A.,
University of Wisconsin-Madison; Ph.D., University of California, San Diego. I thank fellow
participants in the Maryland/Georgetown Constitutional Law Schmooze for their thoughtful
comments on an earlier draft of this Essay, as well as Daniel Levin for his invaluable edito-
rial assistance.
1. See generally MAURO CAPPELLETrI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
(1971); THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbj6rn Vallinder
eds., 1995).
2. TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN
AsIA CASES 3 (2003); RAN HiRSCHL, TOWARDS JURiSTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 1-3 (2004); ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH
JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE 1 (2000); see Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitu-
tional Interpretation After Regimes of Horror 2, 10-11 (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 05, 2000), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
paper.tafabstractid=236219 (discussing the importance of a constitutional judiciary in
newly formed democratic governments).
3. E.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN & YASUO OHKOSHI, To DREAM OF DREAMS: RELIGIOUS FREE-
DOM AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN POSTWAR JAPAN 70-71 (1996); Javier Andrhs Couso,
The Politics ofJudicial Review in Latin America: Chile in Comparative Perspective (Spring
2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley) (on file with author).
4. CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI, THE POWER OF JUDGES 72, 182-83 (C.A.
Thomas ed., 2002); SWEET, supra note 2, at 3; Ran Hirschl, Resituating theJudicialization of
Politics: Bush v. Gore as a Global Trend, 15 CAN.J. LAW &JURIS. 191, 191 (2002); Kim Lane
Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary (Or Why Courts Can Sometimes Be More Democratic
than Parliaments) 30 (Nov. 1, 2001) (unpublished paper presented at a conference on
constitutional courts, Wash. Univ.), http://aw.wustl.edu/igls/Conferences/2001-2002/
ConstitutionalPapers/Scheppele%20paper.pdf.
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mechanism for protecting citizens' rights and their strengthening
thus as a positive step toward securing a meaningful and sustainable
democracy.5 Opponents see judicial empowerment as a move away
from popular self-determination and away from policymaking in the
interest of the masses.6 While the former tend to idealize judges and
the role they play in a constitutional democracy, the latter go to the
opposite extreme, vilifying judges as agents of the elite.
In this Essay, I advocate moving beyond this binary perspective,
arguing that the nature of the role that judges play in contemporary
constitutional democracies depends on a whole host of factors not
captured by either the sunny liberal or the skeptical democratic views.
Judicial behavior and influence are not constants across constitution-
alist systems; they are shaped by numerous factors, including but not
limited to the institutional characteristics of the legal and political sys-
tems in which judges function, which furnish them (and the citizens
and legislators with whom they interact) with particular understand-
ings, incentives, and constraints. Rather than insisting, then, that the
global rise of constitutionalism must be a wholesale good or bad
thing, we should pay more heed to the variation within the trend and
inquire into the different effects that this variation has on political
practice and policy outcomes.
To make this argument, I first offer a brief overview of the liberal
enthusiast and critical democratic responses to the spread of constitu-
tionalism.7 I then provide a brief summary of Ran Hirschl's 2004
book, TowardsJuristocracy,8 which is the only work in this category that
seeks to put these normative claims to a rigorous, comparative empiri-
cal test.9 While I endorse Hirschl's call for methodologically sound
research to ground normative assessments, I call into question the
sweeping negative conclusions he draws. Those conclusions, I con-
tend, are grounded in assumptions or extrapolations which do not
hold across cases, not even the four Hirschl treats in the book. In
particular, I take issue with two premises: first, that judges everywhere
are removed from and unrepresentative of the wider polity; and sec-
ond, thatjudges everywhere are taking over or being handed the reins
5. E.g., RONALD DwoRKuN, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR BRITAIN 24-25 (1990); Bruce Acker-
man, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 772 (1997).
6. E.g., ROBERT H. BoRK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES 1
(2003); HIRSCHL, supra note 2, at 162-63; F.L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, THE CHARTER
REVOLUTION AND THE COURT PARTy 149 (2000); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS 9 (1999).
7. See infra Part I.
8. HiRSCHL, supra note 2.
9. See infra Part II.
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of government, thereby silencing the voices of the people and their
elected representatives. By offering examples of both formal and in-
formal norms that structure the judicial role in a variety of new consti-
tutionalist (NC) countries,"' I demonstrate that in many places, courts
are deeply and explicitly embedded in and contained by the demo-
cratic political process. Precisely how such norms, individually or in
combination, affect that process and its outcomes remains an open
question. What the empirical variety suggests, however, is that the
"real nature of twenty-first-century constitutional democracy" 1 is far
more complex and nuanced than even Hirschl, as a self-styled empiri-
cal social scientist, cares to admit.
I. JUDGES: HEROES OR ANTI-HEROES?
Until World War II, most of the world's democracies rejected ju-
dicial review as a peculiar and highly conservative American institu-
tion, unacceptable in any polity committed to popular sovereignty.
Only government officers whose tenure was subject to electoral con-
trol possessed the legitimacy to determine what the law was or to de-
termine any substantive limits thereto. In many cases, this translated
to a strong commitment to "parliamentary sovereignty."" However,
" [w] hen the Nazi-Fascist era shook this faith in the legislature, people
began to reconsider the judiciary as a check against legislative disre-
gard of [fundamental democratic] principles .... Hence, in the
"second wave" of global democratization that followed WWII, new
constitutions were written to entrench rights principles, and, in places
like Italy, Germany, and Japan, courts were empowered to review the
decisions of elected officials for compliance with these principles. 4
In the years that followed, the appeal of constitutionalism grew such
that by the time the "third wave" of democratization began in the mid-
1970s,' 5 judicial review had become a central element of new demo-
cratic constitutions.1
6
10. For the purposes of this Essay, the label NC applies to all countries that have
adopted judicial review since 1945.
11. HIRSCHL, supra note 2, at 218.
12. I say "many" because there were also presidentialist systems, as in Latin America,
where lawmaking power was split between the executive and legislature and often domi-
nated by the former, be it de jure or de facto.
13. CAPPELLETrI, supra note 1, at viii.
14. Id. at 48 n.8, 74-76.
15. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TwENTI-
ETH CENTURY 3 (1991).
16. GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 6-10; Scheppele, supra note 2, at 2.
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Notable American liberal theorists responded to these develop-
ments with great enthusiasm, encouraging new and old democracies
alike to embrace the promise ofjudicial review and chiding U.S.-based
skeptics for being largely indifferent to or out of step with the interna-
tional trend. For example, Ronald Dworkin, the standard-bearer for
active judicial rights protection, made his approval clear when he
wrote in 1990 in favor of the incorporation of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights into British domestic law and the empower-
ment of British judges to interpret and apply it against statutes passed
by the parliament. 17 He claimed not only that such incorporation
would help cultivate (or re-invigorate) a "culture of liberty" in Britain,
but also that it would be in no way incompatible with a correct or
"true" understanding of democracy."8 He wrote:
[T] rue democracy is not just statistical democracy, in which
anything a majority or plurality wants is legitimate for that
reason, but communal democracy, in which majority decision
is legitimate only if it is a majority within a community of
equals . . . . [P]olitical decisions must treat everyone with
equal concern and respect, that [is,] each individual person
must be guaranteed fundamental civil and political rights no
combination of other citizens can take away, no matter how
numerous they are or how much they despise his or her race
or morals or way of life.
That view of what democracy means is at the heart of all the
charters of human rights, including the European Conven-
tion. It is now the settled concept of democracy .... the
mature, principled concept that has now triumphed
throughout Western Europe [and] North America. 9
In a similar spirit, Bruce Ackerman claimed that "[t]he Enlighten-
ment hope in written constitutions is sweeping the world" and that the
future of liberal democracy looked bright since "when judges inter-
vene, they tend to operate on behalf of internationally-recognized
norms of human dignity. '
This celebration of constitutionalism's spread did not go unchal-
lenged, however. Indeed, towards the end of the 1990s, a number of
highly skeptical, in some cases downright cynical, works emerged chal-
lenging the value of judicial review both in theory and practice.21 Re-
17. DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 20-23.
18. Id. at 1, 35 (emphasis omitted).
19. Id. at 35-36.
20. Ackerman, supra note 5, at 772, 790-91.
21. E.g., BORK, supra note 6; ROBERT DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION? 153-54 (2001); HIRSCHL, supra note 2; DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICA-
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viving the older (and in some circles, persistent) concerns about the
"counter-majoritarian difficulty"22 or the "gouvernement desjuges, "23
these authors have attacked the liberal enthusiasts as, at best, naive
idealists or, at worst, disingenuous elitists.24 While they accept that
rights protection, even beyond that necessary to the democratic pro-
cess, may be integral to democracy,25 they object to the delegation of
the power to define and protect rights to unelected judges. Indeed,
they argue that assigning this task to a small set of insulated "experts"
is an affront to the most basic principle of democracy: political
equality.
26
II. A CALL FOR EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
While most of these works build their arguments in the abstract
or with a single country as the empirical referent,27 Hirschl's book
stands out for its attempt to ground its claims in an explicitly compara-
tive study.28 Taking the liberal triumphalists to task for failing to mar-
shal empirical support for their rosy views, Hirschl offers a critical
analysis of the origins and impact of constitutionalization, focusing on
four countries: Israel, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa.29 His
central claim is that the proliferation of bills of rights and judicial
review around the world does not represent humanitarian progress,
but rather the entrenchment of elite domination.3" Constitutionalist
reforms reflect "an essentially self-serving agenda" on the part of social
and economic elites, who see their prerogatives threatened in the
electoral sphere and promote constitutionalization in order to pre-
TION (1997); MORTON & KNOPFF, supra note 6, at 149; TUSHNET, supra note 6; JEREMY
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 15 (1999).
22. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962).
23. EDOUARD LAMBERT, LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES ET LA LUT-rE CONTRE IA LEGISLA-
'rON SOCIALE AUX ETATS-UNIS (1921).
24. BORK, supra note 6, at 2.
25. SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135-
36 (1980) (arguing that judicial review protects minority rights).
26. Waldron even goes so far as to characterize the U.S. Supreme Court as "a nine man
junta clad in black robes and surrounded by law clerks." WALDRON, supra note 21, at 309.
27. Dahl is an exception as his goal is to try to show how poorly the United States
performs on a number of measures of democratic performance. DAHL, supra note 21.
However, while he discusses judicial review, assessing the independent effect thereof is not
his main focus. Bork, who discusses Canada and Israel along with the United States, is also
an exception, but he makes no pretense of meeting social scientific standards. BORK, supra
note 6.
28. HIRSCHL, supra note 2.
29. Id. at 4, 6.
30. Id. at 11.
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serve their social and political hegemony in times of change." 1 How
and why does this work? Constitutionalization, Hirschl claims, con-
sists of the "wholesale transfer"32 of fundamental policy decisions to
insulated, professional policymaking bodies (courts), which favor
those with disproportionate understanding of, access to, and influ-
ence on those bodies-i.e., the elites.33 By removing fundamental
political decisions from the hands of elected officials, constitutional-
ization stunts political debate and deliberation and discourages citizen
participation. 4 In sum, with the introduction of bills of rights and
judicial review, "'They the Jurists' are granted an elevated status in
determining policy outcomes at the expense of 'We the People,'
laypersons who make up the vast majority of the populace." 5
These constitute very strong, generalizing claims about the new
constitutionalism, all of which Hirschl maintains are bolstered by the
empirical evidence he offers in his book, and all of which appear to
confirm the views of the skeptical democrats. It is not my primary aim
here to challenge the strength of Hirschl's evidence or take issue with
the particular interpretation he offers of the constitutional revolutions
in his four cases (though this can and should be done). Rather, in the
pages that follow, I seek to problematize some of the more sweeping
assumptions and claims that Hirschl, like other democratic skeptics,
makes as he steps back from his cases and assesses the "new constitu-
tionalism" in general. Hirschl has, laudably, thrown down the gaunt-
let regarding the need for public law theorists to ground their
arguments in rigorous empirical research. In that spirit, I seek to call
readers' attention to some important empirical variation in NC coun-
tries and to suggest areas for further social scientific inquiry.3
6
31. Id. at 99.
32. Id. at 222.
33. Id. at 12.
34. Id. at 186. Moreover, Hirschl maintains thatjudges will tend to adopt "uninhibited
Lockean-style individual autonomy" in their interpretations, throwing support behind neo-
liberalism and anti-statism, and, thereby, protecting those with power in the private
sphere-i.e., the elites. Id, at 102, 150-51. 1 do not address this claim here, although I find
it weakly supported by even Hirschl's own data. See id. at 106 tbl.4.2 (providing a table to
demonstrate the relatively low success rate of positive and collective rights claims as com-
pared with negative rights claims).
35. Id. at 187.
36. I do not claim to offer a systematic treatment of all constitutionalist countries. This
Essay is merely suggestive of variables whose effects can and should be rigorously
investigated.
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III. ARE JUDGES IN NC COUNTRIES INSULATED GuARDLkNS?
Hirschl's main argument is based on a stark, albeit partially im-
plicit, distinction between courts as insulated "semiautonomous, pro-
fessional policy-making bodies,"37 on the one hand, and legislatures as
faithful mirrors of the popular will, on the other. Following other
skeptical democrats," 8 he portrays judges as unrepresentative, unac-
countable members (or agents) of the social elite, while implying that
elected officials are (or would be, in the absence of constitutionaliza-
tion) responsive and responsible delegates of average citizens.3 9 A
number of other scholars have challenged the latter part of this for-
mulation, noting the many ways in which public representation can
and does break down in the legislature.4" In what follows, I question
the first part of the claim, arguing that high court judges in many NC
countries are not necessarily as insulated and aloof from democratic
politics as the skeptical democrats contend.
Hirschl devotes little attention to how judicial selection and ten-
ure work in his four focus cases, much less in other NC countries. He
offers the most information about selection and composition of the
high court for the Israeli case, and it is to that case that his argument
perhaps best applies. As he explains, justices to Israel's high court (in
fact, to all of the nation's courts) are appointed by a nine-member
appointments committee composed of three sitting high courtjudges,
two representatives from the Israel Bar Association, two members of
the Knesset chosen by majority through a secret ballot, and "two min-
isters, one of whom is the Minister of Justice."41 Hence, as Hirschl
himself notes, the process is formally depoliticized; that is, there is no
explicit procedure (be it an institutional rule or informal norm) for
achieving any measure of political-party, ethnic, gender, or religious
representation on the high court, except for a customary chair re-
served for a religious justice, which was, until recently, only honored
in the breach.42 Not surprisingly, then, the Supreme Court of Israel
37. HIRSCHL, supra note 2, at 16.
38. E.g., BORK, supra note 6.
39. HIRSCHL, supra note 2, at 12.
40. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FiCKEov, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 1 (1991)
(noting that legislation may represent private rather than public interests because of the
influence of special interest groups); DAVID R. MAVHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECrORAL CON-
NECTION (1974) (arguing that members of Congress are more interested in re-election
than promoting the public good); Paul Frymer & Albert Yoon, Political Parties, Representa-
tion, and Federal Safeguards, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 977, 981-82 (2002) (noting that federal legis-
lators focus on re-election and maintaining party control rather than representing local
concerns).
41. HIRSCHL, supra note 2, at 66.
42. Id. at 67.
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has tended to reproduce itself over the years such that " [o]f the thirty-
six judges who served on the Court during the country's first forty-five
years, all were Jews and thirty were Ashkenazi," and decisions have
overwhelmingly favored secularist views.4"
The Israeli practice appears to reflect an American-style construc-
tion of constitutional law as analogous to ordinary law.44 In Israel, as
in the United States, the high court has (at least since the introduc-
tion of the Basic Laws) a dual function: it has jurisdiction over both
ordinary cases and cases involving constitutional questions.45 Hence,
constitutional law is cast as just another form of law, and constitu-
tional adjudication thus, theoretically, requires from judges no more
and no less than ordinary adjudication (statutory interpretation or
common-law development). Since all they are (or should be) doing is
applying the law, which is a strictly professional or "apolitical" func-
tion, whether or not they are representative of the people, in some
political sense, is (or should be) irrelevant. This is not the way it
works in all other NC countries, however.
In many NC countries, reformers have recognized the deeply po-
litical nature of constitutional decisionmaking-that is, the fact that it
inescapably involves questions of and choices about political moral-
ity4 6-and have established formal institutional mechanisms and/or
informal norms to ensure that judges who decide constitutional cases
have a (much) higher level of representative legitimacy than do ordi-
nary judges. Indeed, in the NC countries of continental Europe,
which share in the civil-law tradition, constitutional courts are often
not even considered part of the judiciary. Because of their obvious
legislative function,4 7 constitutional courts in the civil-law world have
been constructed completely separate from and sometimes in tension
43. Id. at 66-67. For an in-depth analysis of how another autonomous, bureaucratic
judiciary reproduced conservatism and conformity in the judicial ranks, favoring the tradi-
tional elite, see Lisa Hilbink, An Exception to Chilean Exceptionalism?, in WHAT JUSTICE?
WHOSE JUSTICE?: FIGHTING FOR FAIRNESS IN LATIN AMERICA 64 (Susan Eva Eckstein &
Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley eds., 2003) and Elisabeth Hilbink, The Politics of Judicial
Apoliticism: The Institutional Roots ofJudicial Behavior in Chile 1964-2000 (Feb. 1, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
44. STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 13, 16-18 (1996); LARRY D.
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 152-
55 (2004).
45. BORK, supra note 6, at 111-13.
46. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION (1996); see also ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 202-07 (1975) (discussing the
convergence of law and morality issues facing judges presiding over antislavery cases).
47. Constitutional decisionmaking cannot but involve lawmaking, even if only in a neg-
ative sense. See Hans Kelsen, La Garantie Juridictionnelle de la Constitution, 44 REVUE DU
DROIT PUBLIC 197 (1928) (Fr.).
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with the ordinary judiciary. While the ordinary judiciary is conceived
as a civil service bureaucracy, whose function it is to be the "mouth-
piece of the law,"4 constitutional courts are (rightly) understood as
institutions whose function is fundamentally political (not partisan,
but definitely not mechanical or substantively "neutral")."9
Because of this understanding, the appointment rules for consti-
tutional courts in the civil-law world allow explicitly for political nego-
tiation and aim at political inclusion.5" For example, half of the
members of the sixteen-member German Constitutional Court are
chosen by a twelve-person Judicial Selection Committee of the
Bundestag (lower house).51 The committee's membership is deter-
mined by proportional representation, and the committee must pro-
pose a slate of candidates for up-or-down approval by the Bundestag
assembly.52 The other eight justices are chosen by the Bundesrat (up-
per house), composed of delegates from provincial governments, who
must approve candidates by a two-thirds vote." As Ludger Helms
notes, "almost from the very beginning there has been a strong at-
tempt [on the part of the two major parties] at establishing a consocia-
tional system of nominating judges to the Court."54 While never
perfect, the appointment process has worked to provide rough pro-
portionality in partisan, religious, and geographic representation on
the court. 5 In Italy, too, appointments to the Constitutional Court
have long been made through interparty bargaining, and, until 1994,
followed a proportional formula (the lottizzazione).56 Likewise, in
48. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 39 (1969).
49. SWEET, supra note 2, at 21-22; Louis Favoreu, American and European Models of Consti-
tutional Justice, in COMPARATIVE AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 105, 118-19 (David S.
Clark ed., 1990).
50. Victor Ferreres Comella, The European Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation:
Toward Decentralization?, 2 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 461, 468-69 (2004).
51. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUB-
LIC OF GERMANY 21 (1997).
52. Id. at 21-22.
53. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 94(1); Gesetz fiber das Bundesverfassung-
sgerichts [Federal Constitutional Court Act], Mar. 12, 1951 BGBI.I at 243, §§ 5-7; KOMMERS,
supra note 51, at 21-22.
54. Ludger Helms, The Federal Constitutional Court: InstitutionalisingJudicial Review in a
Semisovereign Democracy, in INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE FEDERAL REPUB-
LIC OF GERMANY 84, 87 (Ludger Helms ed., 2000).
55. See Brent Wible, Filibuster v. Supermajority Rule: From Polarization to a Consensus- and
Moderation-Forcing Mechanism for Judicial Confirmations, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 897, 936
(2005) (noting that the German Constitutional Court appointment process has led to a
stable, politically diverse court). There has also been a recent push to appoint more wo-
men to the court. Helms, supra note 54, at 88-89.
56. COST. art. 135; MARY L. VOLCANSEK, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN ITALY. THE CON-
STITUTIONAL COURT 23 (2000).
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Hungary, whose post-Communist reformers followed closely the Ger-
man model, Constitutional Court nominations are handled by a com-
mittee composed of one representative from each party in parliament,
and appointment requires two-thirds approval by the full assembly.57
The political parties are thus the principal players in Constitutional
Court appointments. 8 The same can be said for Spain, where eight
of the twelve members of the Constitutional Tribunal are selected by
the legislature (four by the Senate and four by the Congress of Depu-
ties) and must be approved by a three-fifths majority vote.5 9
In South Africa, meanwhile, which has been influenced by both
the common- and civil-law traditions, there is a Judicial Service Com-
mission (JSC) that integrates representatives from the legislature (ten
total, six chosen by the National Assembly and four from the National
Council of Provinces), the executive (five, four chosen by the presi-
dent in consultation with all the party leaders represented in the Na-
tional Assembly, plus the minister of justice), the judiciary (three,
including the chief justice and the President of the Constitutional
Court), and the bar (four practicing lawyers and one law professor).6'
The JSC prepares a list of nominees with three names more than the
number of appointments to be made (whether to the Constitutional
Court or any other court), and the president makes appointments
from the list.61 The constitution stipulates that "[t]he need for the
judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of
South Africa must be considered when judicial officers are
appointed."62
Even in NC countries of the common-law tradition, there is rec-
ognition of the need to attend to the representativeness of the high
court. In Canada, for example, where the executive has control over
all judicial appointments, there is, as Hirschl himself notes, "a provin-
cially representative formula" for Supreme Court appointments,
63
guaranteeing three justices from Ontario, three from Quebec, two
from the western provinces, and one from the Maritime provinces.64
57. A MAGYAR KOZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 32A(4); ANDRAS
K5ROSENYI, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN HUNGARY 267 (English ed., CEU Press 1999).
58. K6ROSENYI, supra note 57, at 267.
59. C.E. [Constitution] art. 159(1); Heidi Beirich, The Role of the Constitutional Tri-
bunal in Spanish Politics (1980-1995) (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue
Univ.).
60. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 178(1).
61. Id. § 174(4) (a).
62. Id. § 174(2).
63. HIRSCHL, supra note 2, at 80.
64. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26, § 6 (1985).
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Moreover, with the exception of Canada, in all of the systems just
discussed, constitutional court judges do not serve for life. In Ger-
many and South Africa, they serve twelve-year, nonrenewable terms;
65
in Italy and Spain, nine-year, nonrenewable.66 In Hungary, the terms
are nine years and renewable.67 In addition, some countries have a
mandatory retirement age for constitutional court judges: sixty-eight
in Germany and seventy in both Hungary and South Africa. 68 Even
Canada requires that its judges step down at seventy-five.69 Thus, it is
far less likely in these countries than it is in the United States (for
example) that judges will be grossly out of step with the rest of the
political system, representing perspectives that have been long since
rejected by strong popular majorities.7"
As this small sampling of judicial appointment and tenure rules
demonstrates, the degree of insulation or removal from politics that
high court judges enjoy varies from country to country such that not
all judges everywhere are equally unrepresentative or unaccountable.
Granted, high court judges never have to answer directly to voters,
and, even in the stingiest countries, they enjoy term lengths that
elected officials can only dream about. However, the fact that they do
not face elections is often considered enabling: because they don't
have to cater to constituents with particular demands, they are freer to
decide cases on principle than are legislators who must keep one eye
always on the polls.7 While this cannot guarantee that judges will be
better at defending certain values and principles than will legislators,
it does mean that courts stand as "differently organized and differ-
ently responsive" fora.72 Their increased involvement in political life
might thus offer opportunities, not just for traditional elites, but for a
wide variety of citizens, to contribute to the "continuous process of
65. Gesetz fiber das Bundesverfassungsgerichts-Gesetz [Federal Constitutional Court
Act], Mar. 12, 1951 BGBl.I at 243, § 4 (F.R.G.); S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 176(1).
66. COST. art. 135 (Italy); C.E. [Constitution] art. 159(3) (Spain).
67. Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court, art. 8(3) (1989).
68. KOMMERS, supra note 51, at 21; Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court, art.
la, 3; S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 176(1).
69. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26, art. 9(2) (1985).
70. See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Justice for Life? The Case for Supreme Court
Term Limits, OPINIONJOURNAL, Apr. 10, 2005, http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/
feature.html?id=1 10006539.
71. CHRISTOPHER L. EiSGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 58-59 (2001); LAw-
RENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRAC-
TICE 212-13 (2004); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 740"2 (1995).
72. TERRI JENNINGS PERETrI, IN DEFENSE OF A POUTICAL COURT 233 (1999).
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discussion and reflection about what democracy means and
demands."7"
IV. HAVE JUDGES REALLY TAKEN OVER?
A second major assumption that Hirschl and other skeptical dem-
ocrats make is that the undeniable increase in judicial involvement in
political decisionmaking over the past several decades means that the
direct representatives of the people, the elected legislators, have been
increasingly sidelined. In this zero-sum view, one institution's gain is,
by definition, another's loss, and, since it is the courts that have been
gaining in influence, this means that "the persuasion of parliamentary
(and public) debate" has been substituted by "the coercion of court
orders"74 and "the popular will" has been "systematically frus-
trate[d]."" Indeed, the very premise of Hirschl's book is that "[o]ver
the past few years the world has witnessed an astonishingly rapid tran-
sition" to what he subsequently dubs a "new political order-
juristocracy."76
Once again, I submit that this is a perspective that those most
familiar with the U.S. case might be willing to accept, but which
doesn't apply equally to all NC countries. Because the U.S. Constitu-
tion is considered to be analogous to ordinary law,77 it is often said to
be "the province and duty" of the judiciary to say what it means,7" and
once the high court has spoken, the matter is settled, or so the Jus-
tices, and many of their supporters, would have it.7 9 If instead the
executive or the legislature had the power to overrule the Court, to
assert an independent interpretation of the Constitution, the reason-
73. Allan C. Hutchinson, The Rule of Law Revisited: Democracy and Courts, in RECRAFTrNG
THE RULE OF LAW 196, 218 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Scheppele offers evidence that this has been the case in at least two NC countries
(Hungary and Russia). Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Negotiations: Political Contexts of
Judicial Activism in Post-Soviet Europe, 18 INT'L Soc. 219, 232 (2003). Note that Hirschl's
research design doesn't permit the testing of this hypothesis in his four cases because he
measured outcomes in terms of success rates of negative versus positive rights claims, ignor-
ing differences in the constitutional text, the nature of the parties that brought the claims
(elite? non-elite?), and what the popular and legislative responses were to the decisions.
See HIRSCHL, supra note 2, at 106 tbl.4.2.
74. MORTON & KNoPFF, supra note 6, at 155.
75. BORK, supra note 6, at 2.
76. HIRSCHL, supra note 2, at 1, 222. Bork, for his part, goes so far as to claim that
"judges have wrought . .. a coup d'6tat." BORK, supra note 6, at 13.
77. GRIFFIN, supra note 44, at 13.
78. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
79. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536
(1997); see also KRAMER, supra note 44, at 221 (noting that judicial supremacy gained wide
acceptance after the Cooper decision).
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ing goes, then the Constitution's status as law would end, and there
would be little point in having a written constitution.8" This formula-
tion, grounded in a strict law/politics distinction, grants supreme au-
thority to the judiciary in constitutional decisionmaking and sets up
the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature in binary
and oppositional terms.
This is not exactly the way constitutionalism is conceived and
practiced, however, in other polities.8 1 Indeed, some NC countries
provide explicit and easy mechanisms for legislative override, mean-
ing that if judges rule in a way deemed sufficiently outrageous to the
simple legislative majority, they can be overruled. Section 33 of the
Canadian Charter, for example, allows both provincial legislatures
and the national parliament to declare that any of its acts or provi-
sions "shall operate notwithstanding" most of the rights provisions in
the Charter (exceptions are voting rights and election rules, mobility
rights, linguistic rights, and federal guarantees).82 Under Section 4 of
the 1998 Human Rights Act in Britain, which formally incorporated
the European Convention on Human Rights into British law, judges
can make a declaration of incompatibility against any act of parlia-
ment deemed to be in conflict with the European Court of Human
Rights; however, per Section 10, the declaration has no effect on legis-
lation unless the executive, with parliamentary approval, alters the law
80. Marbuy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-78; Dale Carpenter, Judicial Supremacy and Its
Discontents, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 406 n.9 (2003).
81. And, indeed, an increasing number of scholars argue that this does not even accu-
rately describe the U.S. system, whether in theory, in practice, or both. See, e.g., GRIFFIN,
supra note 44, at 113-15 (describing how majoritarian pressures and public opinion influ-
ence Supreme Court decisions); KRAMER, supra note 44, at 227-33 (arguing that judicial
supremacy prevails until judicial activism exceeds the inherent limits placed upon it by the
majority); SAGER, supra note 71, at 224-25 (concluding that constitutional decisions made
by courts do not compromise the democratic principles of the U.S. political justice
scheme); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MicH. L. REv. 577, 646-48 (1993)
(arguing that state legislatures may redefine, narrow, or challenge decisions by the Su-
preme Court by passing laws which tested the extent of constitutional protections); Keith
E. Whittington, Presidential Challenges to Judicial Supremacy and the Politics of Constitutional
Meaning, 33 Pouiv 365, 383 (2001) (arguing that during reconstructive periods, the
sphere ofjudicial review decreases and Supreme Court decisions become more deferential
to the president and the majority's will).
82. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), § 33. Overrides may not be exercised regularly, but the fact that they are not indi-
cates either that politicians don't see it in their interest to assert them (they would pay an
electoral price for doing so) or that there are barriers to cooperation within the legislature,
such that majority preferences are not getting translated into majority action in legislature.
Such an inability to reach simple majority consensus itself problematizes the judicial-elite-
minority/legislative-popular-majority assumption.
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to achieve consistency.8" In New Zealand (one of Hirschl's central
cases!), under the 1990 Bill of Rights Act, judges have even less au-
thority. While Section 6 states that "[w] herever an enactment can be
given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms con-
tained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any
other meaning,"84 Section 4 of the Act explicitly prohibits judges from
refusing to apply or otherwise rendering invalid or ineffective any law
deemed to be in conflict with the bill of rights.85
Hence, rather than playing a "trumping" function, asserting their
superior position, and shutting out the legislature, high court judges
in a number of NC countries might instead be viewed as participating
in and (arguably) nurturing a polity-wide constitutional dialogue.86
As a respected New Zealand legal scholar and high court judge puts it,
"[w] e should not think of a Bill of Rights as simply requiring a choice
between parliament and the courts or elected politicians and non-
elected judges. We should see it as being directed at the lawmaking
process as a whole and indeed as having a wider public and educa-
tional process.
8 7
Even in places where courts can seemingly trump legislatures on
matters of constitutional interpretation, amendment requirements
are often far more easily met than in the United States. As Stephen
Griffin notes, the provisions for formal constitutional amendment laid
out in Article V of the U.S. Constitution "comes close to requiring
unanimity to approve any amendment as a practical matter."88 This
makes the U.S. Constitution arguably the most rigid in the world,
thereby enhancing, at least in theory, judicial supremacy in the sys-
tem.8" Elsewhere, however, a determined legislative majority, or
supra-majority, can far more easily assert its dominance should judges
depart too much from an "acceptable" set of constitutional interpreta-
83. Human Rights Act, 1998, 42 Eliz. 2, c. 42, §§ 4, 10.
84. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109, § 6.
85. Id. § 4.
86. SWEET, supra note 2, at 193; Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dia-
logue Between Courts and Legislatures, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75, 96-98 (1997); Hutchinson,
supra note 73, at 218-19.
87. K.J. Keith, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Experience: Lessons for Australia 6
(June 21, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/publica-
tions/papers/docs/2002/89_KennethKeith.pdf.
88. GR1iFRN, supra note 44, at 29.
89. There is, in some countries, the thornier issue of "unconstitutional constitutional
amendments" (e.g., Germany, South Africa), which really does set constitutional court
judges up as "guardians." As noted above, however, judicial selection and tenure rules
render these judges less insulated from popular majorities than their counterparts in the
United States. See supra notes 51-70 and accompanying text.
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tions. In Israel, for example, the most entrenched of the Basic Laws
require no more than a simple majority of the Knesset to change.90 In
Hungary, a one-time vote by two-thirds of the members of parliament
is sufficient.91 In Italy, amendment can be achieved by two successive
votes in parliament, separated by at least three months, requiring a
simple majority in both houses. 92 This may be followed by a popular
referendum, unless the amendment passes by at least two-thirds ap-
proval in the second round, in which case a referendum is not neces-
sary.93 In Spain, three-fifths approval in both houses of parliament is
required, with an alternative envisioned that encourages cooperation
between them.94 As in Italy, a referendum may be demanded by a
parliamentary minority.95 In short, the spread of bills of rights and
judicial review over the past fifty years may have altered the relation-
ship between legislatures and courts around the world, but the varia-
tion in the way this relationship is formally structured in different NC
countries is striking and important. It is simply not accurate to claim
that judges everywhere have eclipsed, or even have the formal poten-
tial to eclipse, legislators.
In sum, just as a slightly more detailed look at judicial selection
and tenure rules weakens the claim that high courtjudges everywhere
are insulated and unrepresentative, a brief consideration of the varia-
tion in the way the role of the high court is constructed and limited in
different countries throws into doubt the notion that judges every-
where are brandishing constitutions to impose their will on legislative
majorities.96 Once again, a closer examination reveals an important
90. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1994, S.H. 90, § 7. Given the notorious frag-
mentation of the Israeli political system, this is much easier said than done, but it remains,
nonetheless, a majoritarian rule.
91. A MAGYAR KCZTARSASAG ALKOTMANYA [Constitution] art. 24(3).
92. CosT. art. 138.
93. Id
94. C.E. [Constitution] art. 167(1).
95. Iet at art. 167(3).
96. Indeed, a more accurate critique of NCjudges might not be that they are frustrat-
ing/trumping majorities, but that they fail to protect minorities. If it is true, as Dahl notes,
that because of the judicial selection process, the U.S. Supreme Court tends to reflect the
interests of the dominant political coalition, the logic should apply even more strongly in
many of the NC countries, where judicial tenure is shorter and judicial appointment more
openly politicized/politically determined. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:
The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957). A rigorous com-
parative empirical analysis of how and why courts respond to rights claims by historically or
structurally disadvantaged minorities versus how they respond to rights claims by social
elites, like Marc Galanter's article, might be very revealing. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'v REv. 95 (1974).
However, evidence of failure to protect such minorities would not necessarily support the
claim that democracy (majority rule) is losing ground tojuristocracy; rather, it might well
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degree of political embeddedness for courts. Judges with constitu-
tional review power are not necessarily cast as guardians that stand
outside of and above the democratic system, able to invoke their legal
expertise to trump legislative majorities and cut off public debate.
Rather, in numerous NC countries, institutional rules and mecha-
nisms bring judges into direct contact and dialogue with both citizens
and their elected representatives and clearly limit the ability ofjudges
to dictate political outcomes. Courts in these countries might thus
instead be viewed as "essential components of, rather than limitations
on, democratic governance."97
V. CONCLUSION: BEYOND MANICHEANISM
Judicial review, once an institution unique to the United States,
has now become a staple around the world, presenting American pub-
lic law scholars with an unprecedented opportunity to test their argu-
ments empirically.98 To date, however, most authors have been
content to make "simple, sweeping claims,"99 whether positive or neg-
ative, about the effects of the new constitutionalism. Liberals have
tended to celebrate the trend, while those more concerned about de-
mocracy have condemned it. In this Essay, I have sought to compli-
cate the picture by bringing to light some of the variety in the way that
the judicial role has been constructed in NC countries. In so doing, I
hope to encourage scholars to move beyond the stark, essentializing
claims of the established debate and to encourage inquiry into the
different effects that this variation has on political practice.
Both sides in the existing debate tend to argue in dichotomous
and/or essentialist terms. Either constitutionalization reflects a noble
commitment to rights principles (the sunny liberal view) or it's a crass
power grab on the part of an elite minority (the skeptical democratic
view). Either judges are heroic and principled, while legislators are
venal and self-interested (the sunny liberal view); or judges are out-of-
touch elites, while legislators are authentic representatives of the peo-
ple (the skeptical democratic view). Public decisions are either legal,
and therefore to be decided by judges, or political, and therefore only
fair game for elected officials or the people themselves (both sides
with different criteria). The involvement ofjudges in policymaking is
either a boon for or a travesty of "true" democracy.
reveal the opposite: an inability on the part of courts to challenge dominant views and
policies, revealing the ultimate triumph of politics over law (or power over principle).
97. Scheppele, supra note 73, at 236.
98. HIRSCHL, supra note 2, at 6.
99. Id. at 218.
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My argument is that such binary thinking gets us nowhere. As I
have shown above, in numerous NC countries, judges are neither sep-
arate from nor supreme over the political process, but are, in many
and varied ways, embedded in and contained by that process. Hence
we would be far better off attempting to build our arguments from the
bottom-up, formulating hypotheses around the empirical variety (only
some of which I have described above) and designing our research
with an eye to testing for the effects of that variation. As Hirschl states
in the conclusion to his book: 'Judicial interpretation and implemen-
tation of constitutional rights depend to a large extent on the ideolog-
ical atmosphere, specific institutional constraints, and economic and
social meta-conditions within which they operate." 100 I could not
agree more. So let's get down to the business of trying to determine
which of these variables matter most.
100. Id.
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